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Instead of NS, consider a ‘National Social Service’

COMMENT

(This is a continuation of “Singapore’s outdated national security policies”)

If Singapore’s security threats have indeed evolved over the years—and no longer includes “potentially hostile Muslim neighbours”—then the country needs to adapt, and prepare itself for today’s main threats: pirates and terrorists.

In order to combat them, Singapore needs a good Navy, Coast Guard and Counter-terrorist units. But it does not need many large traditional divisions of the Army, including Armour, Infantry and Guards.

One could argue that Singapore does not need an Air Force either. But given its tiny size, it might be prudent to maintain the highly-efficient Singapore Air Force as an additional deterrent to would-be aggressors, especially since it is conceivable that a terrorist attack could be airborne.

Finally, as Singapore has been doing, it should continue to push the boundaries of high-technology military research. Drones, unmanned vehicles, robots, and other futuristic weaponry should be deployed to defend Singapore against the groups that pose a threat today: pirates and terrorists.

In this context, how should Singapore restructure National Service (NS)? When Singaporeans reflect on the benefits of NS, two things stand out. The first relates to discipline and independence. The second is social integration. NS forces the sons of tycoons to sweat it out next to the sons of taxi drivers, bridging divides, to some degree, in a drastically unequal society.

Any change to the NS system should ideally preserve these two benefits. Therefore, perhaps two-year mandatory National Service for males could be replaced by a six-month mandatory “National Social Service” (NSS) for all Singaporeans, including new citizens. NSS will involve a combination of assistance to lower-income Singaporeans and developmental work around South-east Asia.

In other words: Instead of Singaporean males preparing for war against supposed hostile Muslim neighbours, all 18-year old Singaporeans must spend six months helping the less fortunate, both in Singapore and in the immediate region.

NSS is not Summer Camp. Recruits will work long hours on real projects with defined deliverables and performance assessments. These projects could range from assistance to disadvantaged children in Singapore to reconstruction work in post-tsunami Aceh. Discipline, integrity, hard work and team work must be emphasised. Law and order should not be compromised.

Those who choose to sign on as regulars in the Armed Forces, Police or Civil Defence should be exempt from this six-month NSS. Foreigners below the age of 50 who want to become Singaporeans will have to serve this six-month NSS at some point after they get their citizenship.

NSS could benefit Singapore in many ways. First, NSS would not only preserve two of the main advantages of the current two-year NS—discipline and social integration—but it would extend these to all Singaporeans. Furthermore, by including naturalised citizens, NSS will balance the obligations of Singapore-born citizens with those of foreign-born citizens, helping the integration of new migrants.

Second, NSS will improve social cohesion in Singapore. NSS represents, to some degree, a redistributive transfer to Singapore’s lower-income and disadvantaged groups, who will benefit from targeted assistance by the programme.

Third, NSS will not interrupt Singaporean kids’ higher-education dreams. As it is only six months long, it can easily be completed between secondary and tertiary education. Singaporean males will no longer feel handicapped educationally and professionally in comparison to women and foreigners.

Fourth, NSS will boost Singapore’s standing—or “soft power”—in the region. While there are many instances of Singaporean individuals or organisations providing aid and assistance to the broader ASEAN community, its national efforts are irregular and often only in the wake of specific disasters, such as the tsunami in 2004.

Other countries have similar international development programmes—e.g. the USAID—and given how globalised and rich Singapore is today, it arguably has a moral obligation to implement one. From a political and economic viewpoint, there are many benefits that might accrue from boosting Singapore’s “soft power” in the region. NSS will further solidify Singapore’s position as the pre-eminent city for the ASEAN area, as regional integration continues apace.

From a national security viewpoint, NSS could be a tremendous boon—Singapore’s international relations and future security are arguably better served by sowing goodwill in its backyard than by maintaining its Armed Forces. NSS can, in effect, be used as a potent tool to achieve Singapore’s foreign policy objectives.

But as with any major policy change, there will be several different constituencies who will resist.

The first group comprises the national security hawks who believe that a huge, active and strong military is essential for Singapore’s survival. Within this group there are at least two competing narratives.

The first narrative is the old, traditional one that harks back to the 1960s and maintains that Singapore is under threat from potentially hostile Muslim neighbours. The second narrative acknowledges that while potentially hostile Muslim neighbours are no longer serious threats, Singapore’s economic and political power depends on its strong military power.

But even if Singapore must maintain a credible military force, then what exactly is “credible”? It would seem, given the per capita military spending numbers mentioned in the earlier article, that Singapore has a lot of latitude to reduce military spending while still being able to project the necessary economic and political power for the country’s development.

Aside from the hawks, another group that might resist demilitarisation includes any individual or corporation invested in Singapore’s military industrial complex. No doubt, as Singapore demilitarises, it must ensure that current professionals in the Singapore Armed Forces are not disenfranchised.

Certain members of the ruling party may also be against any demilitarisation as the status quo serves them well: as in many other countries, fear-mongering provides some political currency to the incumbents.

Nevertheless, it would be naïve for Singaporeans to assume that its neighbours will always be pleasant. There is a possibility that Singapore will one day have to contend with serious international disputes with its ASEAN neighbours.

Although China and the US are heavily invested in the region today, and provide enough of a deterrent to would-be aggressors, their geopolitical priorities will evolve over time. Therefore, even if Singapore demilitarises, it must always keep open the possibility of remilitarisation.

All these changes will free up government funds for spending on social services; reduce social inequalities; improve social cohesion and integration; enable Singaporean males to better compete in the global knowledge economy; sow goodwill in ASEAN; allow Singapore to achieve its foreign policy objectives through the use of “soft power”; and continue to protect Singapore from its main security threats.

Despite the strong arguments in favour of demilitarisation, disabusing many Singaporeans of this siege mentality that they have grown up with will not be easy.

Then again, maybe there really is some small chance that Malaysia will invade Singapore tomorrow, as hawks have long suggested. Just like there is some small chance that the world will perish tomorrow, as the Mayans once predicted.

This Op-ed is an excerpt from a longer analysis that you can read here.

Sudhir Thomas Vadaketh is a senior editor with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The views expressed here are purely his own. Sudhir is the author of Floating on a Malayan Breeze: Travels in Malaysia and Singapore, a socio-economic narrative on the two countries.